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GOVERNING A GLOBAL COMMONS:
SHARKS IN THE HIGH SEAS
JARED R. WIGGINTON*
The purpose of this Article is to address the problem of shark
population depletion in the high seas due to finning at an interna-
tional level. This Article first offers an introduction to the problem
of shark finning, distilling the fundamental issues the international
community must address. Second, the Article explains the mechan-
ics, strengths, and weaknesses of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). Third, the Article
provides several recommendations, first advocating for remedying
the parts of the UNCLOS regime that are failing and against a gen-
eral reliance on the CITES regime for shark protection. It then
considers what a shark conservation treaty should look like, if one
were adopted, and the need for a Global Fishery Management Or-
ganization (GFMO). And, finally, the Article advocates for in-
creased and strategically focused diplomatic efforts with China to
promote the full adoption and implementation of existing and po-
tentially new international fishery laws pertaining to sharks.
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO SHARK FINNING AND THE
OVEREXPLOITATION OF SHARKS
On March 11, 2013, during the sixteenth meeting of the Con-
ference of the Parties, members of CITES elected to list five new
shark species in Appendix II of the Convention.' An Appendix II
listing requires that species only be traded with CITES permits and
evidence that they are harvested sustainably and legally.2 All of the
newly listed shark species are harvested primarily for their fins.3
Thus, this listing seemingly represents a victory for opponents to
shark finning. 4 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of CITES and other
existing international law in combatting the depletion of shark
populations due to finning and conservation is questionable.
Shark finning is the practice of cutting off the fins and tail of a
live shark and throwing its living body back into the ocean to die
either by suffocation, starvation, or from a predator. With the price
of a single fin ranging from 100 to 10,000 dollars5 and mercury-
1. 2013 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species -Year of the Shark,
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, http://www.pewenvironment.org/news-room/compila-
tions/2013-convention-on-international-trade-in-endangered-species-year-of-the-
shark-85899421595/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (discussing CITES efforts to pro-
tect sharks through legislation in 2013). The new species listed include the por-
beagle, oceanic whitetip, great hammerhead, smooth hammerhead, and scalloped
hammerhead sharks. Id.
2. CITES Conference Takes Decisive Action to Halt Decline of Tropical Timber, Sharks,
Manta Rays and a Wide Range of Other Plants and Animals, CITES (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://www.cites.org/eng/news/pr/2013/20130314-copl6.php (highlighting
meeting in which CITES conference passed measures to protect sharks, among
other environmental issues).
3. See id. (noting some of these species are also harvested for meat).
4. Id. (praising members of conference for taking steps to protect sharks).
Past efforts to list the Porbeagle and other sharks have failed. Id.
5. Gary Strieker, Fin Market Threatens Sharks, CNN TECH (Aug. 20, 2002, 1:08
PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2002/TECH/science/08/20/fin.market.threat/
(detailing dangers imposed by fin market); see also New Survey Finds Economic Incen-
tive for Protecting Ocean Resources, OCEANA (Aug. 21, 2008), http://oceana.org/en/
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laden shark meat priced below fifty-cents per pound,6 fishermen
have a strong incentive to keep only the fins and throw the rest of
the shark overboard. The high price of shark fins comes from the
demand for shark fin soup, a Chinese delicacy symbolizing wealth,
power, prestige, honor, and virility that dates back to the Ming Dy-
nasty.7 This delicacy is now within the buying power of many more
Chinese, as the country has an estimated population of over 1.3
billion people8 and a growing middle class of three hundred mil-
lion people.9 Given these facts, the low-capital nature of shark fin-
ning, and an annual market value of 1.2 billion dollars,10 curbing
the practice will be difficult.
As national waters and their respective economic exclusive
zones (EEZ) are depleted of sharks, rational fishermen will work
their way to the high seas. Alternatively, governments may strategi-
cally restrict shark fishing in their waters to encourage fishermen to
access the resources in the high seas before other parties deplete
them. The high seas, to the extent that they are unregulated, or
regulated and unenforced, are global commons facing a familiar
news-media/press-center/press-releases/new-survey-finds-economic-incentive-for-
protecting-ocean-resources (discussing scuba divers' contributions to local econo-
mies). Interestingly, a survey of divers indicates that they will pay more to view
wildlife where conservation efforts rehabilitate such valued species as sharks. See
New Survey Finds Economic Incentive for Protecting Ocean Resources, supra. The survey
further indicates that divers would be willing to pay an additional annual total of
$212 million. Id. This is in addition to the more than $4 billion that divers con-
tribute to coastal communities. Id. Another report suggests that sharks are worth
more alive for purposes of ecotourism than dead for their fins. Id. See also Paula
Walker, Oceans in the Balance: As the Sharks Go, So Go We, 17 ANUMAL L. 97, 167-68
(2010).
6. Shark Fin Trade Myths and Truths: SHARK MEAT vs FINS, SHARK SAVERS,
http://www.sharksavers.org/files/6413/3046/1775/SharkMeat FACTSHEET_
Shark Savers.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (explaining disparity in price between
shark meat and fins).
7. See History of Shark Fin Soup, SHARK TRUTH, http://www.sharktruth.com/
learn/history-of-shark-fin-soup/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (describing history and
popularity of shark fin soup).
8. China Population 2014, WORLD POPULATION REv., http://worldpopulation
review.com/countries/china-population/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (providing
population of China).
9. Meet China's Booming Middle Class, BBC NEWS (July 19, 2012), http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/business-18901437 (discussing size and state of China's middle
class); see also Annalyn Censky, China's Middle-Class Boom, CNN MONEY Uuly 26,
2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/26/news/economy/china-middle-class/
(exploring growth of middle-class in China in recent years).
10. Colin Simpson, Dubai Push to Regulate Global Shark Trade, NATIONAL (Oct.
7, 2012), http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/environment/dubai-push-to-
regulate-global-shark-trade (providing valuation on annual shark finning market).
2014] 433
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tragedy." The tragedy of the commons is the idea that shared and
limited resources will be depleted because individuals will act inde-
pendently and rationally in self-interest in the pursuit of maximiz-
ing their resources.12 Resource depletion will occur despite
individuals' general understanding that depleting the common re-
source is contrary to their long-term best interests.13 Thus, al-
though it is in the common interest to conserve fisheries, each
fisher's immediate interest is best served by catching as many fish as
possible.14 Shark species in the high seas are no exception to this
tragedy. In 2008, of 591 shark species on the World Conservation
Union (IUCN) Red List, 126 were listed as "globally threatened,"
107 as "near threatened," and the status of 205 could not be deter-
mined because the data was deficient.1 5
In attempting to find an international solution to shark deple-
tion on the high seas, it is important to distill what is really at issue
and the kind of approach that should be taken. Much of the discus-
sion about shark finning, whether by the media or academics,
frames it first as an issue of cruelty. 16 The practice is cruel because
the fins are hacked off sharks and their bodies are thrown back in
the ocean to die. This cruelty is exacerbated by the perceived
wastefulness of the process. While appeals to pathos have strength-
ened public support around the issue in nations that value animal
welfare, these appeals have likely weakened chances of developing
an international consensus regarding the overfishing of sharks be-
cause such appeals are culturally relative and detract from the real
issue of shark sustainability.
To date, there is no international animal cruelty law against
shark finning. But, even if there were such a law, the issue could be
11. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, 1243 (Dec. 1968),
available at https://www.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243.full (explaining
"tragedy of the commons" phenomenon).
12. HOLLY DoREMus ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAw: PROBLEMS, CASES,
AND READINGS 12-13 (Foundation Press, 6th ed. 2012) (describing "tragedy of the
commons" in greater detail).
13. Id. (expounding on "tragedy of the commons").
14. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
763 (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 2011) (stating why convincing fisherman to con-
serve individually is not effective).
15. Walker, supra note 5, at 156-57 (listing categorization of dangers to many
species of sharks).
16. See, e.g., id. (stating shark finning is amongst most wasteful and cruel ex-
ploitation of animals currently practiced in world today); see also Ingrid M. Gron-
stal Anderson, Jaws of Life: Developing International Shark Finning Regulations Through
Lessons Learned from the International Whaling Commission, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 511, 535 (2011) (stating ISFC should ban shark finning entirely due
to brutal nature of it).
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solved by adopting a stun and quick kill procedure similar to that
used in U.S. slaughterhouses. Further, the argument against waste
could be addressed by the benefits shark carcasses will produce for
scavenger marine species, including other sharks. Thus, focusing
on cruelty, a culturally relative principle that can easily be remedied
without addressing the real problem of shark sustainability, is un-
wise. At another level, explicitly or implicitly demonizing Asian cul-
tures that consume shark fins to maintain their traditions is
ethnocentric,17 while framing the issue as one of marine and eco-
nomic sustainability is less so.
At its heart, then, the issue of shark finning is really about
overfishing sharks and is problematic primarily because of its eco-
logical and associated economic effects. From an ecological per-
spective, sharks are highly vulnerable to overexploitation because of
their large size, late maturation, and low fecundity:' 8 Additionally,
as apex predators, sharks are critical to maintaining, regulating,
and balancing their ecosystems and food webs.19 Specifically,
sharks help increase diversity in ecosystems by regulating their prey,
providing food sources to scavengers, and maintaining a healthy
spatial distribution of prey and community structures. 20 Directly re-
lated to these ecological disruptions is their potential to cause eco-
nomic harm to industries dependent on both shark and general
marine fisheries.21 Scholars have estimated that economic activities
17. See Chinatown Neighborhood Ass'n v. Brown, No. C 12-3759 PJH, 2013
WL 60919, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2013) (claiming California's recent ban on sale,
trade, and possession of shark fins specifically targets Chinese populations and is
attempting to compel them to change their cultural practices).
18. Shark Reproduction: Facts and Information, BioEXPEDITION, http://bioex
pedition.com/shark-reproduction/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (noting depending
on species, it can take up to fifteen years before sharks mate for first time). Due to
overfishing, the population of the porbeagle shark has been reduced by an
estimated seventy percent of its historical levels. CITES 2013: Porbeagle shark,
PEw ENvrL. INITIATIVEs, http://www.pewenvironment.org/news-room/fact-sheets/
cites-2013-porbeagle-shark-85899426386 (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (providing facts
about specific species of shark).
19. Predators as Prey: Why Healthy Oceans Need Sharks, OCEANA, 1 (July 2008),
http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/reports/Predators-asPreyFINALFINAL
1.pdf (describing shark functions in ocean ecosystem); see also Sharks' Role in the
Oceans, SHAluK SAvERs, https://www.sharksavers.org/en/education/the-value-of-
sharks/sharks-role-in-the-ocean/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (describing sharks' im-
portance in ocean ecosystem).
20. Id. (detailing sharks' various roles in maintaining ecosystem of oceans).
21. See Andres M. Cisneros-Montemayor et al., Global Economic Value of Shark
Tourism: Implications for Conservation 381-88 (Fisheries Ctr., Univ. of British Colum-
bia, Working Paper No. 2012-04, 2012), available at http://www.fisheries.ubc.ca/
webfmsend/34 (discussing increasing viability of shark watching ecotourism as
means for shark conservation). Globally, 590,000 shark watchers make up an
ecotourism industry of $314 million and 10,000 jobs. Id. As shark conservation
2014] 435
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supported by marine fisheries amount to 240 billion dollars annu-
ally.22 In 2011, marine fisheries produced 78.9 million tons of
fish.23 In 2008, marine fisheries directly employed thirty-four mil-
lion people in fishing operations.24 In addition to economic impor-
tance, marine fisheries support food security, supplying more than
4.3 billion people with at least fifteen percent of their average
animal protein intake.2 5 The potential ecological and economic
chain reaction and other uncertainties associated with shark deci-
mation suggest that the international community should be vigilant
about protecting shark fisheries.
II. EXISTING AND PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS
A. The UNCLOS Regime: UNCLOS, UNFSA, and RFMOs
1. Basic Mechanics of the UNCLOS Regime
The UNCLOS and the United Nations Fish Stock Agreement
(UNFSA) are two international treaties that are supposed to oper-
ate consistently with each other.26 Regional Fisheries Management
relates to general marine fishery health, it is also important to recognize that the
FAO estimates that 8% of the world's major fisheries are depleted, 19% are overex-
ploited, and 52% are fully exploited, leaving just 20% of the world's marine fish
population under- or moderately-exploited. Id.; see also HUNTER ET AL., Supra note
14, at 761.
22. A.J. Dyck & U.R. Sumaila, Marine Fisheries and the World Economy, J. OF
BIOECONOMIcs, 2 (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/News/PressReleases/Protectingocean_1ife/Pew%200SS%20
World%20Economy%20FINAL.pdf (detailing scope of fisheries' economic
impact).
23. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: 2012, FAO, 3 (2012), http://
www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2727e/i2727e.pdf (highlighting magnitude of fish
taken from ocean annually).
24. Id. (noting in 2008, fisheries industry provided livelihoods for 540 million
people, or about eight percent of the world's population); see also Oceans: Rio 2012
Issues Briefs, U.N. CONFERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.uncsd2012.org/
content/documents/216Issues%2OBrief%2ONo%204%200eansFINAL.pdf (pro-
viding overview of international efforts in oceans).
25. FAO, supra note 23, at 3-19 (explaining fisheries' importance in feeding
world's population).
26. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37, at 4 (Sept. 8,1995)
[hereinafter UNFSA], available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N95/274/67/PDF/N9527467.pdPOpenElement (relating to conservation
and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks). Note that the
scope of this treaty appears to include only straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks. See id.
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Organizations (RFMOs) are bodies born of these treaties.27 UN-
CLOS is the broader and more powerful of the two treaties, with
165 ratifying parties28 and claims that it constitutes international
customary law and therefore binds even parties that have not rati-
fied it.29 UNCLOS establishes ocean jurisdictional limits and associ-
ated rights that must be discussed to understand fishery laws. Of
particular relevance are the limits of territorial waters, twelve nauti-
cal miles offshore from coastal States,30 and the EEZ, which extends
two hundred nautical miles from a State's coastline.3 1 Within their
respective territorial waters, coastal States have exclusive fishing
rights.3 2 However, within their respective EEZ, coastal States have
only limited rights to explore and exploit natural resources, both
mineral and living.33 These rights are limited by each coastal
State's duty to manage and conserve living marine resources and to
allow other States to fish in the EEZ if the coastal nation lacks the
capacity to harvest the optimum yield.34 Ocean area beyond the
EEZ is considered the high seas3 5 and will be the jurisdictional fo-
cus of this Article.
Unlike those found in territorial waters or the EEZ, living
marine resources in the high seas are open to exploitation by all
States, whether coastal or landlocked, subject to several con-
27. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121, at
65 (Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at http://www.un.org/depts/
los/convention-agreements/texts/unclos/unclos.e.pdf (defining rights and re-
sponsibilities of nations in their use of seas).
28. Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement
Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention Relating to the Conservation and Man-
agement of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/status20l0.pdf (last updated Jan.
10, 2014) (outlining member States' participation in UNCLOS).
29. See United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10 (1992) (noting artificial
alterations to coastline extend country's boundaries); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456
F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006), opinion withdrawn (holding UNCLOS represented
a codification of customary international law); Stewart M. Patrick, (Almost) Everyone
Agrees: The U.S. Should Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, ATnarric (June 10, 2012, 7:21
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2012/06/-almost-every-
one-agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty/258301/ (commenting on
United States becoming party to UNCLOS).
30. UNCLOS, supra note 27, at art. 3(2) (noting limits of territorial waters).
31. Id. at art. 51 (establishing "exclusive economic zones").
32. Id. at art. 193 (noting States' sovereign rights to exploit marine
resources).
33. Id. at art. 56 (listing States' rights with respect to EEZ).
34. Id. at arts. 61-62 (providing general provisions relating to "high seas").
35. UNCLOS, supra note 27, at art. 86 (providing general provisions relating
to "high seas").
2014] 437
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straints.3 6 First, all States' fishing rights are subject to their other
treaty obligations.37 Therefore, if a State signed a treaty prohibiting
catching sharks in the high seas, that provision is binding upon the
State. Second, all States have a duty to take or cooperate with other
States in taking measures for regulating their respective nationals as
necessary for conservation of the living resources of the high seas.38
And third, States are to cooperate in the conservation and manage-
ment of living resources in the high seas by entering into regional
fishery organizations focused on conservation where their nationals
fish for the same living resources or in the same areas.39 As a part
of this cooperation, States are to determine the total allowable
catch (TAC) and establish other conservation measures based on
the best scientific evidence available to maintain or restore popula-
tions of harvested species at levels which can produce the maxi-
mum sustainable yield. 40 However, this duty to establish and
adhere to TACs is qualified by "relevant environmental and eco-
nomic factors, including . . . special requirements of developing
States." 41 This would seem to suggest that a State might not fully
exploit its TAC if certain environmental conditions are present, or
might go beyond its TAC in the case of developing countries.
The UNFSA, as an appendage to UNCLOS, provides more spe-
cific obligations and recommendations for marine sustainability.
The stated purpose of UNFSA is to ensure the long-term conserva-
tion of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.42 Thus, UNFSA
primarily regulates the high seas, 43 but would not include shark
stocks found only in the high seas. Like with UNCLOS, to achieve
these goals, parties are to adopt measures based on the best scien-
tific evidence available designed to maintain or restore stocks at
36. Id. at art. 87 (listing several freedoms associated with high seas).
37. Id. at art. 116 (noting States' right to fish in high seas).
38. Id. at art. 117 (noting States' duty to adopt necessary measures relating to
conservation of high seas).
39. Id. at art. 118 (noting States' duty to cooperate with each other in conser-
vation efforts).
40. UNCLOS, supra note 27, at art. 119 (listing methods to determine total
allowable catch).
41. Id. (noting certain qualifications in determining total allowable catch).
42. UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 2 (providing agreement's objective).
43. Id. at art. 3(1) (noting agreement's application to fish stocks in high seas).
The treaty imposes duties on both coastal States and those States fishing the high
seas, including adopting measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of strad-
dling and highly migratory fish stocks. Id. Straddling stocks include those fish
found either within the EEZ of two or more States, or both within the EEZ of one
State and the high seas. Id. Highly migratory stocks are those species listed in
Appendix I of UNCLOS. Id.
8
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levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield.44 Maxi-
mum sustainable yield is the largest catch that can be taken from a
species while maintaining its population's maximum growth rate. 45
Also similar to UNCLOS, these requirements can be qualified based
on environmental and economic factors. 46  Other obligations
under UNFSA include collecting and sharing fishing data, con-
ducting appropriate scientific research, applying the precautionary
principle, protecting marine diversity, and enforcing the measures
adopted.4 7
As suggested, the primary means for accomplishing the duties
imposed by UNCLOS and UNFSA are RFMOs. 4 ' To date, seven-
teen RFMOs have been established.49 RFMOs are composed of
members that are fishing the high seas for a particular fish stock
and relevant coastal States.50 Additionally, any State that has a "real
interest" in the fisheries concerned may become a member of an
RFMO.5 1 Interestingly, non-members are not precluded from be-
ing allocated TACs or other fishing rights if they accept the conser-
vation and management measures adopted by the RFMO. 5 2 Finally,
RFMOs are charged to do the following: agree on conservation and
management measures; agree on participatory rights and accom-
modation of interests of new members States; promote and conduct
scientific assessments of stocks and impacts on non-target and asso-
ciated species; obtain and evaluate scientific advice; compile and
44. Id. at art. 5(a)-(b) (providing agreement's general guiding principles).
45. See George K. Walker, Defining Terms in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
IV. The Last Round ofDefinitions Proposed by the International Law Association (American
Branch) Law of the Sea Committee, 36 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 133, 178-79 (2005) (discuss-
ing several sources that explain "maximum stability yield").
46. UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 5(b) (noting parallel qualifications to best
scientific evidence available method).
47. Id. art. 5(c), (g), (j)-(1) (listing various obligations under UNFSA).
48. MARGARET A. YOUNG, TRADING FISH, SAVING FISH: THE INTERACTION BE-
TWEEN REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 39 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011) (discuss-
ing involvement of RFMO in swordfish dispute between Chile and European
Community).
49. FAQ: What is a Regional Fishery Management Organization?, PEW CHARI-
TABLE TRUSTS (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.pewenvironment.org/news-room/fact-
sheets/faq-what-is-a-regional-fishery-management-organization-85899371934 (dis-
cussing number of RFMOs).
50. UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 8(3) (discussing participation in RFMOs).
51. Id. (noting States with "real interest" in fisheries may join RFMO). The
meaning of "real interest" is unclear, but signifies an intention to restrict access to
regional fisheries. Id. This ability to restrict access to regional fisheries would
seem to allow for politics of exclusion, but article 8(3) requires that the terms of
participation be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion. Id.
52. Id. at art. 8(4) (noting States may be given fishing access if they are RFMO
members or if they comply with conservation measures established by such
RFMO).
2014] 439
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disseminate statistical data from the fisheries; and establish mecha-
nisms for monitoring, control, surveillance, and enforcement.53
Further, "[w]here an RFMO exists, parties are generally expected
to implement the organization's measures into national law, and
cooperate with the organization by having their fisheries enforce-
ment agencies enforce the RFMO's measures."54
In summary, both UNCLOS and UNFSA have provisions for
maintaining sustainable fisheries on the high seas. Both require
the setting of TACs after determining the maximum sustainable
yield of the particular stock based on the best scientific evidence
available. UNFSA goes into greater detail, constraining TAC deter-
minations with the precautionary principle55 and concerns for
maintaining biodiversity.56 Additionally, RFMOs have a right to ex-
clude those seeking membership that do not have a legitimate, real
interest in the fishery.57 And, finally, both treaties have an obliga-
tion to establish TACs using the best scientific evidence available
for both members and non-members.5 8 Understanding the frame-
work created by these international agreements and the structure
of RFMOs, it is necessary to gauge their success in shark sus-
tainability in the high seas.
2. Application, Strengths, and Weaknesses of the UNCLOS Regime
Despite a reasonable structure and clear direction from inter-
national treaties and guidelines,59 many consider RFMOs to be
"weak and ineffective," lacking institutional support and a global
53. Id. at art. 10 (listing RFMO's obligations under UNFSA).
54. Stijn van Osch, Note, Save Our Sharks: Using International Fisheries Law
Within Regional Fisheries Management Organizations to Improve Shark Conservation, 33
MICH.J. INT'L L. 383, 418 (2012) (citing UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 20) (discuss-
ing requirements of RFMOs).
55. See UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 6 (explaining application of "precaution-
ary approach"). UNFSA notes, "States shall be more cautious when information is
uncertain, unreliable or inadequate." Id. at art. 6(2). It further states, "The ab-
sence of adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for postpon-
ing or failing to take conservation and management measures." Id.
56. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on
Biological Diversity, art. II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (vol. IV) (June 5, 1992)
(noting biodiversity is defined in Biodiversity Convention to include biodiversity
within species, between species, and of ecosystems).
57. TORE HENRIKSEN, LAW AND POLITICS IN OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE UN FISH
STocxs AGREEMENT AND REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT REGIMES 20 (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 2006) (discussing exclusion of RFMO membership).
58. See UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 11 (discussing obligations relating to
non-members under UNFSA).
59. See generally Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF
THE U.N. (1995), http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM (set-
ting international standards for fishing activities).
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body that oversees their operations.60 RFMOs are also considered
unsuccessful in taking meaningful action to ensure sustainable
shark stocks.61 Most RFMOs seem focused mainly on ensuring ac-
cess rights to exploit fisheries instead of conserving them,62 sug-
gesting they are not adhering to the precautionary principle by
which they are bound under UNFSA. 63
RFMO failure can be attributed to a few pervasive problems:
lack of data and insufficient enforcement related to illegal, unre-
ported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and flags of convenience
(FOC). Article 117 of UNCLOS has been interpreted to require
data collection. 64 Similarly, the UNFSA specifically requires RFMOs
to promote and conduct scientific assessment of fish stocks and to
obtain and evaluate scientific advice on the status of stocks.65 This
requirement makes sense because fishery conservation depends
critically on accurate scientific data concerning the population size
and age distribution to determine the status of a fish population,
data that is often difficult to gather.66 For deep-water sharks living
in the high seas, obtaining data is even more difficult.6 7 Measuring
high seas stocks has been compared to flying over the Serengeti at
night in a helicopter, dropping a net, and estimating the total zebra
population from those caught in the net.68 Despite these shortcom-
ings, the data available for sharks suggests most species are declin-
ing and none are increasing.69
In total, IUU and FOC fishing constitute fifteen percent of the
entire global fishery capture, and, in areas where large stocks of
commercially valuable fish are found, the level exceeds this per-
60. YOUNG, supra note 48, at 45 (outlining criticisms of RFMOs).
61. Osch, supra note 54, at 411 (noting various scholars comment on insuffi-
ciency of RFMO effort in protecting sharks).
62. YOUNG, supra note 48, at 40 (finding that many RFMOs act as entities that
misuse access rights).
63. UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 6 (stating "precautionary approach" require-
ment under UNFSA).
64. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 775 (clarifying article 117 of UNCLOS).
65. UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 10(d),(g) (noting several functions of
RFMOs).
66. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 775 (outlining scientific data important
for fishery conservation).
67. See Osch, supra note 54, at 412-13 (noting difficulty in obtaining data re-
garding deep-water sharks).
68. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 775 n.4 (explaining issues in measuring
number of sharks located in high seas).
69. Osch, supra note 54, at 413 (stating available data suggests that shark pop-
ulation is declining).
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centage. 70 IUU fishing is a problem for several reasons. First, it
interferes with RFMO-established TACs. If RFMOs are calculating
the maximum sustainable yield and allocating all of it, any IUU
catch would make the particular fishery unsustainable. Second,
IUU fishing discourages non-member States from making efforts to
cooperate with RFMOs because they can receive benefits without
incurring costs. Third, IUU fishing often uses illegal gear and tech-
niques that have detrimental effects on the ocean ecosystem.7' One
study has shown that in terms of environmental degradation and
bycatch, FOC vessels (engaged in IUU fishing) cause twenty times
more harm than regulated vessels. 72
FOCs refer to the problem that arises from the ability of fishing
vessels to register their ship in a jurisdiction with lax regulations, a
complete inability to enforce their regulations, or tacit assent not to
enforce their standards. Because the law of the flag State takes pre-
cedence over the law of the port State,73 vessels engaging in illegal
activities can shield themselves behind their flag States. Flag States
have little motivation to regulate these ships because overfishing in
the high seas generally does not affect them74 and they receive the
benefits of registration and tonnage fees for their lack of regula-
tion.75 An exception to the deference to flag State jurisdiction oc-
curs when a flag State has repeatedly disregarded its obligation to
enforce international rules and standards effectively in respect to
violations committed by its vessels.76 But proving a history of non-
enforcement is difficult without access to a State's enforcement pro-
70. See DARREN S. GALLEY, MARKET DENIAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION:
THE TARGETED AND EFFECTIVE USE OF TRADE MEASUREs AGAINST THE FLAG OF CON-
VENIENCE FISHING INDUSTRY 50 (2012) (explaining how global fishing average of
fifteen percent is exceeded in some areas).
71. Id. at 51 (noting detrimental effects caused by IUU fishing). It is esti-
mated that FOC longlines kill over 300,000 seabirds every year. The Threats, ROYAL
Soc'Y FOR THE PROT. OF BIRDS, https://www.rspb.org.uk/supporting/campaigns/
albatross/problem/threats.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). Additionally, high seas
bottom trawling is another severe problem in its destruction of habitat; it has been
labeled the world's most destructive type of fishing. L.E. MORGAN ET AL., WHY THE
WORLD NEEDS A TIME-Our ON HIGH-SEAS BOTTOM TRAWLING 4 (Deep Sea Conser-
vation Coal. 2005).
72. CALLEY, supra note 70, at 53 (describing increased danger of FOC vessels).
73. See UNCLOS, supra note 27, at art. 94 (stating controlling law is decided
by flag State).
74. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 804 (explaining lack of regulation on
behalf of flag State).
75. Id. at 808 (describing lack of regulation's benefits).
76. UNCLOS, supra note 27, at art. 228 (discussing difficulties in proving his-
tory of non-enforcement).
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ceedings.7 7 Thus, lack of data, IUU fishing, and FOC pose signifi-
cant obstacles to overcome in protecting shark stocks under the
UNCLOS regime.
B. CITES Regime
1. Basic Mechanics of the CITES Regime
Recently, many scholars have emphasized using CITES as a
means for protecting sharks from overfishing.78 As mentioned in
the introduction, these efforts have arguably paid off with the re-
cent addition of five sharks species to Appendix II of CITES.79 This
section will examine the protections offered by CITES and assess its
strengths and weaknesses as a means for protecting sharks.
CITES regulates the global trade in species that are threatened
with extinction and currently has 178 member States, including
China and the United States.80 CITES protection comes from its
three appendices, which establish varying levels of permit require-
ments for the import and export of endangered and threatened
species and the parts or specimens of species derived therefrom.81
Specimens are defined to include "any readily recognizable part or
derivative" of a listed animal or plant.82 Under the agreement,
each party is required to designate a management authority to issue
permits for trade in species and a scientific authority to provide ad-
vice on imports and exports.83
77. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 807 (stating difficulties in proving history
of non-enforcement).
78. See generally CALLEY, supra note 70 (presenting method to protect sharks
from overfishing); Osch, supra note 54 (finding CITES has "been active in shark
conservation"); Walker, supra note 5 (finding CITES has "flexible framework");
YOUNG, supra note 48 (finding CITES attempts to prevent extinction of renowned
animal species); Anderson, supra note 16 (stating CITES will result in reduction in
shark finning); Kaitlin M. Wojnar, Note, Shark Laws with Teeth: How Deep Can U.S.
Conservation Laws Cut into Global Trade Regulations, 19 ANIMAL L. 185, 192 (2012)
(stating CITES has goal of preventing "over-exploitation" of certain species).
79. 2013 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, supra note 1
(adding five shark species).
80. Member Countries, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/index.
php (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (listing CITES member countries).
81. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, art. II, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 Mar. 3, 1973, 27
U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES] (providing root of authority to
regulate).
82. Id. at art. I (defining specimens).
83. Id. at art. IX (requiring each party to designate management and scien-
tific authority).
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Under CITES, Appendix I includes all species threatened with
extinction which are or may be affected by trade.84 Appendix II
includes all species that may become threatened with extinction
and other species that must be subject to regulation so that trade in
its specimens may be brought under effective control.85 Finally, Ap-
pendix III includes all species that a party identifies as being subject
to regulation within itsjurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or
restricting exploitation and needing cooperation of other parties to
control its trade.86 In order to list a new species in either Appendix
I or II, a two-thirds vote is required for those members present and
voting.87 For proposed marine species, the CITES Secretariat (Sec-
retariat) must consult with intergovernmental organizations88 to
obtain scientific data and to ensure coordination with any existing
conservation efforts organizations already have in place.89
Permit requirements related to the species listed in Appendix I
are the most stringent. First, the export of any specimen in this
category requires a prior grant and presentation of an export per-
mit.90 An export permit can only be granted after the Scientific
Authority of the exporting State has determined that such an ex-
port will not be detrimental to the survival of that species.91 In ad-
dition, the Management Authority of the exporting State must be
satisfied that the specimen was not obtained in contravention of
laws of that State; that any living specimen be prepared and
shipped so as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health, or
cruel treatment; and that an import permit has been granted for
such a specimen.92 States also need an import permit to import
Appendix I species.93 To obtain this permit, the Scientific Author-
84. Id. at art 11(1) (requiring listing of all species threatened by extinction
and potentially affected by trade).
85. Id. at art. II(2) (a)-(b) (requiring listing of species already subject to some
form of regulation).
86. CITES, supra note 81, at art. 11(3) (explaining which species are included
in Appendix II).
87. Id. at art. XV(1) (b) (outlining voting requirements to add species to Ap-
pendix I or II). Abstentions are not counted in determining whether the two-
thirds threshold has been satisfied. Id.
88. See id. at art. XV(2) (b) (noting inclusion of RFMOs).
89. Id. (discussing coordination with existing regulations).
90. Id. at art. 111(2) (requiring prior grant and permit for Appendix I
species).
91. CITES, supra note 81, at art. III(2) (a) (noting granting permit requires
determination of Scientific Authority).
92. Id. at art. 111(2) (b)-(d) (explaining State's Management Authority re-
quires satisfactory findings before permit can be issued).
93. Id. at art. 111(3) (noting import permit must also be acquired for Appen-
dix I species).
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ity of the importing State must determine that the import will not
be for purposes detrimental to the survival of the species and that
the proposed recipient of living specimens is suitably equipped to
house and care for it.94 Finally, the importing State's Management
Authority must be satisfied that the specimen is not to be used for
primarily commercial purposes.9 5 For Appendix II species, only the
aforementioned export permit requirements must be satisfied.9 6
Lastly, importing Appendix III listings require a certificate of origin
for all trade in the species, and, if the species is from the listing
State, a Management Authority export permit is also required.9 7
The last, and arguably most important, provision of CITES per-
tains to enforcement. The treaty leaves enforcement of the provi-
sions that prohibit trade to the parties.98 Specifically, this
enforcement is to include measures that penalize trade in or posses-
sion of specimens violating the treaty99 and to provide for confisca-
tion and return to the State of export of such specimens.100
2. Application, Strengths, and Weaknesses of the CITES Regime
Having reviewed the mechanics of CITES, it is now necessary to
consider CITES' application to the newly listed sharks and to gauge
its likely success in curbing the problem of unsustainable shark fish-
ing practices. Based on the provisions examined, using CITES to
ensure sustainable shark fisheries will require sufficient data and a
two-thirds consensus among parties of the Convention. While both
of these tasks are daunting, the latter poses the greatest problem.
Recall that the recent successful listing of five shark species in Ap-
94. Id. at art. 111(3) (a)-(b) (outlining concerns Scientific Authority should re-
solve before issuing permit).
95. Id. at art. 111(3) (c) (outlining Management Authority's requirements).
For marine species taken from the high seas listed in Appendix I, an exporter is
required to satisfy requirements similar to domestically captured Appendix I spe-
cies. Id. at art. 111(5). Similarly, for those listed in Appendix II, requirements are
found in article IV(6). Id. at art. IV(6). Both provisions require certification that
the introduction will not be detrimental to the survival of the species. Id. at arts.
111(5), IV(6). Moreover, there are a series of exceptions to the general trade re-
striction provisions in article VII of the treaty. Id. at art. VII.
96. CITES, supra note 81, at art. IV (detailing requirements for granting of
export permits).
97. Id. at art. V(2)-(3) (listing requirements for granting export or import of
any specimen of species).
98. Id. at art. VIII(1) (enumerating measures to enforce CITES provisions).
99. Id. at art. VIII(1) (a) (requiring penalties for trade or possession of listed
species).
100. Id. at art. VIII(1) (b) (requiring confiscation or return of species follow-
ing exportation that violates CITES).
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pendix II of the Convention had failed twice before. 01 Some
might argue that the members of Convention are now prepared to
protect sharks; however, this would be a premature assessment
given the reluctance of major fishing nations to use CITES as a
form of marine fishery protection. 102 As a result of efforts to use
CITES more for marine protection, multiple nations have made
proposals to formalize the interaction between CITES and
RFMOs. 0 3 Japan, for example, has proposed requiring prior ap-
proval by the United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) or its subsidiary bodies or RFMOs before any CITES listing
could occur.104 Japan's proposal, if adopted, threatens the viability
of using CITES as a means of comprehensive shark conservation by
slowing down and potentially stopping relevant proposed listings.
Given Japan's success in leveraging support for its proposals in the
International Whaling Commission (IWC),105 it would not be sur-
prising if it could muster similar support among members of CITES
over time.
CITES does have several clear strengths. One of those is its
enforcement, as CITES has the potential to punish and prevent the
illegal trade of listed shark species. Market measures can have a
great impact on the ability of IUU fishing and FOC fleets to profit
from their actions, assuming the closed market is large enough.106
Thus, with sufficient application of the convention, sharks and parts
of sharks caught illegally would hypothetically be impossible to land
and sell, eliminating the primary incentive to harvest sharks for fin-
ning. In addition, CITES offers the potential for even broader pro-
tection of shark species in its "look-alike" provision.10 7 Under this
provision, species that have a similar appearance to other species
101. CITES, supra note 81, at art. VIII(1)(b) (penalizing for trade of five
shark species).
102. YOUNG, supra note 48, at 7 (noting fishing nations stance on CITES).
103. See id. at 154 (detailing proposals to change relationship between CITES
and RFMOs).
104. Id. at 169 (discussing Japan's requirements for CITES listing).
105. Japanese Whaling: Ending Japan's Southern Ocean Whaling, GREENPEACE,
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/oceans/whaling/end-
ing-japanese-whaling/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (discussing Japan's whaling con-
troversy); Whaling in Japan, WDC, http://uk.whales.org/issues/whaling-injapan
(last visited Apr. 23, 2014) (same).
106. CALLEY, supra note 70, at 174 (describing impact of market measures on
illegal trade in sharks).
107. CITES, supra note 81, at art. II(2) (b) (introducing "look alike"
provision).
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listed in Appendix 1108 shall be included in Appendix 11.109 Finally,
CITES also allows for global enforcement, overcoming State claims
of sovereignty in their own waters.110
There are several significant weaknesses of CITES when it
comes to protecting sharks. First, the restrictions only become le-
gally applicable when a listed species enters the stream of interna-
tional commerce."' This means that fishermen from nations that
have a high demand for sharks and shark fins can land their haul
for domestic consumption without punishment. Another weakness
is the need for a significant administrative structure to participate
in and enforce the Convention's provisions. States lacking the ca-
pacity and/or political will to establish such an administrative struc-
ture will not be able to implement the regime effectively.1 12
Therefore, where States lacking capacity and/or political will are on
both the importing and exporting side of international trade in
sharks, there will arguably be no meaningful enforcement, and thus
no meaningful deterrence. Additionally, even where member
States have administrative capacity, absent a significant effort to ver-
ify the authenticity of import and export permits, fraud can become
a major problem.
The provisions of CITES themselves are also problematic.
First, they cannot combat habitat destruction associated with IUU
fishing.' 13 Second, they offer no protection of species not being
internationally traded. 14 Third, because sharks are harvested pri-
marily for their fins and not their meat, there is a risk that finning
vessels will seek to change the physical properties of shark fins, per-
haps by processing them on the ship, so as to make them un-
108. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1071 (explaining what species are com-
mon to Appendices I and II).
109. Currently there are no sharks listed in Appendix I. However, if a species
of shark was listed, then other species with similar looking fins could be protected
under Appendix II. One way for fishermen to bypass this would to take the sharks'
whole carcass, but that would undermine their ability to maximize profit by filling
their haul with shark fins.
110. ANNA WILLOCK, UNCHARTED WATERS: IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND POTEN-
TIAL BENEFITS OF LISTING TOOTHFISH IN APPENDIX II OF CITES 18 (2002), available
at http://www.traffic.org/species-reports/traffic-species-fish20.pdf (discussing
global enforcement of CITES).
111. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1069 (listing restrictions when species
enter international commerce).
112. See CALLEY, supra note 70, at 172 (explaining how lack of administrative
infrastructure hurts implementation).
113. Id. at 201 (stating habitat destruction by IUU countries cannot be cur-
tailed by CITES).
114. Id. at 200 (stating CITES does not protect internationally-traded
species).
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recognizable to inspection agents.115  Fourth, the treaty's
introduction from the sea provisions provide little protection for
species harvested from the high seas because it only requires that
the CITES Scientific Authority of the State of introduction be satis-
fied that the introduction will not be detrimental to the survival of
the species. 116 A fifth problem with the convention is its reservation
system, which allows any member to object to a proposed species
listing. 117 In the case that a party objects to an approved listing,
that party will be treated as if it is not a member of the convention
for the trade in that species.' 8 Finally, trade between non-member
States, or between non-member States and member States not
treated as a party for specific species, has the potential to under-
mine CITES.119
Perhaps the greatest problem with CITES is that it is responsive
and not preventative. CITES is not a convention that will guarantee
sustainable shark fisheries because, by its own terms, it should not
become effective until the species is threatened with extinction or is
likely to be threatened with extinction.120 Thus, CITES members
are obligated to wait until there is evidence that shark species are
sufficiently threatened before they can make a proposal to list a
relevant shark species. And then, members will face the task of gar-
nering the necessary two-thirds vote required for listing the species
accordingly. Thus, unlike the UNCLOS regime, 121 CITES cannot
reasonably be relied on as a means of protecting sharks in the first
instance, but instead only in the last.
115. Under CITES article I(b) (iii), a specimen of a species means "any readily
recognizable part or derivative thereof." CITES, supra note 81, at art. I(b) (iii).
While some have suggested the possibility of genetic testing where a species cannot
be determined, such a requirement is likely politically and economically unfeasible
for most members. CALLEY, supTa note 70, at 186.
116. WILLOCK, sup-a note 110, at 15 (stating CITES introduction of species is
based only on whether introduction is detrimental to the species).
117. CITES, supra note 81, at art. XV(3) (allowing parties to notify in writing
any reservations with respect to amendment). Note that the provisions for objec-
tions and reservations have been critical to the Convention's success in gaining so
many parties. See id.
118. Id. (explaining consequences for party who objects to approved listing).
119. Article X allows for parties of CITES to trade with non-parties where
non-parties can produce comparable documentation from competent authorities
substantially conforming to the requirements of the Convention. Id. at art. X.
120. Id. at arts. rt. II, III (containing definitions and fundamental principles
that explain when CITES applies to certain species).
121. See UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 6 (stating countries shall subject species
to enhanced monitoring in order to review their status).
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III. ENSURING A SUSTAINABLE SHARK, FISHERY: SYNTHESIS, GAP-
FILLING, AND DIPLOMACY
A. Regime Repair and Reconciling the Roles of UNCLOS and
CITES
Recognizing that both UNCLOS and CITES have significant
weaknesses in their ability to ensure sustainable shark fisheries, it is
necessary to determine what the best solution would be. It would
be unrealistic to ignore or work around these regimes given their
entrenchment in international law. Therefore, the optimal solu-
tion will require recognizing and defining the role of the regimes,
fixing their respective weaknesses, and then filling in the legal gaps
with new international law.
The first question is what the role of each treaty regime should
be to maximize the sustainability of shark populations. It is argua-
ble that these regimes should operate completely independently to
avoid even greater conflict, but such an approach would lead to
inefficiency in resource use and shark protection. Thus, a better
approach will include coordination and cooperation between these
two regimes where they have common interests. For example, to
determine whether to protect a shark species and how much pro-
tection the species' needs, both regimes will require sufficient data
about the species' populations. Instead of investing their limited
resources in two independent research studies, these two regimes
should designate the responsibility to the regime that is in the best
place to perform these studies. In this case, it would likely be the
existing RFMOs that should perform these studies given their prox-
imity to specific fisheries and the local knowledge they are bound to
have. Because RFMOs will carry the burden and provide the bene-
fits of research in such a case, the CITES regime should contribute
to the costs. Note that there may be circumstances where this can-
not work, such as where conflicts of interest arise and the integrity
of the studies would be questionable.
At the same time, each regime must be free to operate inde-
pendently to fulfill its mandates and perform its unique role. The
UNCLOS regime imposes specific duties to ensure maximum sus-
tainable yields of shark stocks by fixing appropriate TACs. In some
cases, TACs may be based on allowing for the repopulation of a
depleted shark stock. Thus, imagining a continuum for shark con-
servation, the UNCLOS regime would be more on the preventative
side, though it arguably covers the entire scale, offering some reme-
dial protection. CITES specifically focuses on protecting species
2014] 449
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both threatened with extinction and on the verge of being
threatened with extinction if intervention does not occur. There-
fore, CITES would fall mostly on the remedial side of the shark
conservation continuum.
Understanding their respective purposes, it is now possible to
identify and respond to each regime's most critical weaknesses re-
garding their roles in shark protection. As mentioned, the primary
weaknesses for comprehensive shark conservation facing the UN-
CLOS regime include insufficient data, IUU fishing, and FOC. The
fundamental weaknesses of CITES predominately include its pre-
sumption of administrative capacity and its constant need to over-
come political conflicts to obtain new listings of sharks. Each of
these weaknesses will be addressed.
The three guiding principles for fisheries law are harvest levels
based on scientific data, regulation of the species through its whole
range, and broad consideration of the relevant ecological factors
affecting conservation of the species and its habitat.122 Thus, the
first step is to obtain scientific data, in this case the best scientific
evidence available.123 As mentioned above, data can be difficult to
gather.124 Procuring this data will require a significant investment
of resources from under-resourced entities. Ideally, this funding
should be obtained regionally within RFMOs from their respective
members. Funding for this research could also be obtained by pen-
alties levied against those violating fishery laws, including TACs.
This money should be focused on species exclusively found in the
high seas because member nations will have incentives to contrib-
ute additional funds for straddling and highly migratory stocks sea-
sonally found within their EEZs. With that money, research
priorities should be set. As apex predators facing a rapid decline
across the globe, shark species should be at the top of that research
list. RFMOs might consider investing in regional monitoring sta-
tions to accomplish these goals. These stations could dually be
used for enforcement efforts.
When considering the relationship between data collection
and policymaking, it is clear that the implementation of environ-
mental law and policy often proceeds in the face of scientific uncer-
122. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 768 (enumerating principles forming
basis of fisheries law).
123. UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 5(b) (requiring countries ensure conserva-
tion measures are based on best scientific evidence available).
124. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 775 (explaining difficulties in collecting
scientific evidence).
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tainty.125 Decision-makers are required to make value judgments
and policy determinations on the information they have. 126 Still,
obtaining the best data possible is required to reduce risk and un-
certainty. One of the main concerns related to gathering data
about sharks and other marine life is the difficulty getting an accu-
rate population count given the vastness of the seas and unfamiliar
migratory patterns. While this problem is understandable, it can-
not be used as an excuse for failing to make the best attempts possi-
ble. Tagging, tracking, and monitoring techniques in cooperation
with other scientific organizations can provide a baseline from
which to start - a baseline that can be modified as new informa-
tion is discovered and advances are made in research methods.
With this baseline data, techniques such as modeling that produce
simulations of the real world based on limited information should
be developed to determine populations of shark species.' 27 RFMOs
and scientists should also look to the IWC's Scientific Committee
and their Revised Management Procedure (RMP), which has devel-
oped the most rigorously tested management procedure for a natu-
ral resource yet.128 The RMP first establishes its catch limit based
on an algorithm that is designed to account (1) for all variables
affecting the stability of whale stock sizes and (2) for setting a catch
limit that ensures sustainable whale populations.' 29 Second, it
maintains an ongoing population assessment and monitoring pro-
gram. 30 And third, it implements an observer scheme to guaran-
tee its success.' 3' While imperfect,' 32 the RMP is considered a
successful model.
Acknowledging the significant limitations on available data re-
garding shark populations, the precautionary principle should be
applied when adopting policies related to all sharks in the high
125. Robert L. Glicksman, Bridging Data Gaps Through Modeling and Evaluation
of Surrogates: Use of the Best Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity Under the
National Forest Management Act, 83 IND. L.J. 465, 465 (2008) (discussing relationship
between environmental law and scientific data).
126. See id. at 471 (using Congress' forcing of agencies to use scientific data
for justification as example).
127. Id. at 469 (explaining how agencies make decisions despite lack of scien-
tific data).
128. A. W. Harris, The Best Scientific Evidence Available: The Whaling Moratorium
and Divergent Interpretations of Science, 29 WM. & MARY ENvrL. L. & POL'v REv. 375,
395 (2005) (discussing similar procedures in whaling issues).
129. Id. at 392-93 (discussing first step of RMP).
130. Id. at 393 (discussing second step of RMP).
131. Id. (stating last step of RMP).
132. Id. at 395 (noting bias can always cause issues in any surveying
technique).
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seas. Under UNFSA, State parties are legally bound to apply this
principle to straddling and highly migratory shark stocks.' 33 Seem-
ingly, this requirement would extend to RFMOs through their State
members as they make policy determinations on fishing gear re-
quirements, TACs, and other regulations. Assuming this extension,
RFMOs would be required to improve decision-making by ob-
taining and sharing scientific data and establishing precautionary
reference points. 134 The precautionary reference points include a
limit reference point and a target reference point. Limit reference
points are to set the boundaries that will constrain the harvest of
shark within safe biological limits within which the stocks can pro-
duce maximum sustainable yield.135 Target reference points are in-
tended to meet management objectives. 36 If this precautionary
principle is applied correctly, where there are significant gaps of
data, parties are to take "cautious conservation and management
measures" until there is sufficient data.137 Therefore, the weakness
of data collection in shark protection in the high seas can be over-
come by increasing funding, establishing data baselines, adopting
modeling techniques, prioritizing research, and meaningfully ap-
plying the precautionary principle.
The second step for ensuring fishery sustainability is regulating
the lawful harvest limits established by the RFMOs as related to the
other two weaknesses of the UNCLOS regime: IUU fishing and
FOC. These problems are interrelated because IUU fishing contin-
ues due to lack of enforcement by port States and FOC. Addition-
ally, "RFMOs . . . rely on member states to control their fleets,
which are identified through the flags they fly,"' 38 but nationals of
an RFMO State "can re-flag their vessels with non-member states to
escape regulation."' 3 9
The first potential solution to this problem is found within
UNFSA. First, parties to an RFMO are supposed to implement the
organization's regulations into national law and then assist the or-
ganization by enforcing those regulations.140 Additionally, the
133. UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 6 (stating application of precautionary
approach).
134. Id. at art. 6(3)(a)-(b) (stating States must share data).
135. Id. at Appendix 11(2) (explaining precautionary reference points in
detail).
136. Id. (defining target reference points).
137. Id. at art 6(6) (discussing measures to be taken in new or exploratory
measures).
138. YOUNG, supra note 48, at 40 (discussing how fleets are identified).
139. Id. at 41 (explaining how those in RFMO State can escape regulation).
140. Osch, supra note 54, at 418 (discussing enforcement).
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol25/iss2/2
GOVERNING A GLOBAL COMMONS
UNFSA requires parties to take measures to deter activities of non-
party vessels undermining effective implementation of the agree-
ment.141 Port States also have the authority to board a vessel and
inspect documents, gear, and catches.' 42 And the UNFSA "extends
port-state jurisdiction to disallow landings and transhipments where
it has been established that the catch has been taken in a manner
which undermines the subregional, regional or global conservation
and management measures on the high seas."s4 3 Some "RFMOs ...
have taken measures requiring their member states to do exactly
[these things, including] . .. ban [ning] imports of some fish prod-
ucts caught illegally."144 These measures have reduced some IUU
fishing, but there are currently no port State measures for shark
protection. 145 One potential incentive to increase enforcement
would be to allow port States to confiscate and sell catches estab-
lished to have been taken in contravention to existing laws. This
creates an incentive to enforce for the port State and an incentive
not to engage in IUU for fishermen. To the extent that the en-
forcement incentive would not be compromised, such revenue
should be required to go to the RFMO to which the port State
belongs.
Another way to increase accountability and efficient enforce-
ment comes from advances in technology. For instance, vessel
monitoring systems (VMS) are becoming more popular among
RFMOs.' 4 6 These systems relay a vessel's location back to their gov-
ernment who, at least within the Commission for the Conservation
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), then has the ob-
ligation to relay that message to the Secretariat.147 As vessels enter
141. UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 33 (discussing non-parties to agreement).
142. Id. at art. 23 (discussing enforcement mechanisms).
143. YOUNG, supra note 48, at 42-43 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (outlining some requirements of UNFSA).
144. Osch, supra note 54, at 419 (noting other steps some States have taken
according to RFMO).
145. Id. (noting RFMO measures' effects on fish and sharks).
146. Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), COMM'N FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RESOURCES, http://www.ccamlr.org/en/compliance/
vessel-monitoring-system (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (discussing VMA use in
CCAMLR and use of data gained from VMS); Vessel Monitoring System Reimbursement
Program (VMS), PAC. STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMM'N, http://www.psmfc.org/pro-
gram/vessel-monitoring-system-reimbursement-program-vms (last visited Mar. 3,
2014) (noting use of VMS in Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission); Vessel
Monitoring System, W. & CENT. PAC. FISHERIES COMM'N, http://www.wcpfc.int/ves-
sel-monitoring-system (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (noting use of VMS in Western
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission).
147. COMM'N FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RE-
SOURCES, supra note 146 (discussing obligations to relay message).
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protected areas or demonstrate abnormal movements, govern-
ments are capable of sending enforcement teams out to verify the
legality of their actions.148 Currently, VMS are costly to buy and to
use, 149 limiting their potential effectiveness. However, some fisher-
ies and governments are subsidizing their adoption, 150 and the or-
ganization Sea Shepard has had some success working with the
Galapagos National Park Service to adopt VMS measures. 15 1 Re-
quiring that real time data be sent to respective RFMOs in addition
to flag States will reduce FOC opportunity to undermine
regulations.
Other methods for addressing IUU fishing under the UN-
CLOS regime include the use of observers, inspections, and catch
documentation schemes (CDS). In areas of the high seas subject to
the regulatory authority of an RFMO, inspectors of the member
States may board and control vessels of other member States and
non-members, provided both the inspecting and inspected States
are parties to UNFSA.152 This authority allows member States to
ensure proper gear is being used and no illegal fishing occurs. Ob-
servers are arguably a better tool. In theory, an observer on each
boat would document catch and ensure the vessel was complying
with applicable laws. The simple presence of an observer would
also deter illegal fishing. This approach has several drawbacks.
First, it has the potential to be very expensive. Second, there is a
risk of improper influence by fishermen, or capture of the observ-
ers. Third, depending on the size of the vessel in question, observ-
ers' abilities to document everything that is happening could be
limited. Another option for improving enforcement is CCAMLR's
CDS. The CDS is a certification system designed to distinguish be-
tween legal and illegal Patagonian Toothfish harvested and to track
them through trade.153 Because CDS relies on issuance from flag
States, the possibility of fraud or mistake remains a problem.
148. Vessel Monitoring System and Automatic Identification System, SEA SHEPHERD,
http://web.archive.org/web/20130121113111 /http://www.seashepherd.org/
galapagos/vessel-monitoring-and-automatic-identification-systems.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2014) (explaining government supervision of vessel crews).
149. Id. (noting that in addition to paying for equipment, there are addi-
tional fees for use of satellites to transfer data).
150. Vessel Monitoring System Reimbursement Program, supra note 146 (discussing
reimbursement program for VMS given by PSMFC).
151. Vessel Monitoring System and Automatic Identification Systems, supra note 148
(describing Sea Shepard's work at Galapagos National Park Service).
152. UNFSA, supra note 26, at art. 21(1) (providing authority for member
State party to board and inspect fishing vessels).
153. Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS), COMM'N FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
ANTARCHc MARINE LIVING RESOURCES, http://www.ccamlr.org/en/compliance/
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Unlike the UNCLOS regime, there is not much that can be
done to cure the CITES regime problems of building political con-
sensus for listing species and ensuring administrative capacity and
enforcement among member States. One might argue that mem-
ber States' unilateral ability to list shark and other species in Appen-
dix III offers meaningful protection. However, before a member
State can list a species, it must currently protect that species under
its domestic laws.15 4 Thus, this constraint shifts the political conflict
to the domestic arena. In terms of its practical effect on protecting
sharks, Appendix III listings require only a certificate of origin un-
less the species is being exported from the State that listed it. In
that case, it needs an export permit. Because the sharks at issue
here are being overfished on the high seas, in reality, only certifica-
tion stating that the shark was caught on the high seas will be re-
quired. Such a requirement will likely have no practical impact in
reducing fishing for those shark species.
Finally, it is unclear how the international community can ad-
dress the lack of administrative and enforcement capacity among its
members. The existing CITES Trust Fund providing support for
developing country members is grossly underfinanced. 155 Assum-
ing that it was adequately financed to support developing country
capacity in implementing the CITES, overcoming enforcement in-
ertia and corruption would likely be an issue.15 6
Based on their roles within the shark conservation continuum
and their weaknesses, three things become clear about the UN-
CLOS and CITES regimes. First, the UNCLOS regime has the
greatest breadth, flexibility, and capacity to protect shark popula-
tions despite the ineffectiveness of RMFOs, lack of data, and insuffi-
cient enforcement mechanisms. Second, CITES is limited in scope
and is therefore nothing more than a supplemental tool in fighting
the epidemic of shark depletion from finning. Third, even as a sup-
plemental tool, CITES should not be relied upon for meaningful
shark protection given the political and administrative barriers to
catch-documentation-scheme (last updated Dec. 19, 2013) (describing mechanics
of CDS as required in Convention Area).
154. CITES, supra note 81, at art. XVI(1) (describing process for submitting
species to Secretariat).
155. See How is CITES Financed ?, CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/fund.
php (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (discussing CITES Trust Fund and its funding
sources).
156. See Simon Rogers, Corruption Index 2012 from Transparency International:
Find Out How Countries Compare, GuARDiAN (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/news/datablog/2012/dec/05/corruption-index-2012-transparency-intema-
tional# (identifying most corrupt countries and contributing factors).
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its effectiveness. Efforts should be invested in more productive ap-
proaches. This being the case, market-based solutions to shark de-
pletion may have an important role in new treaties.
B. Filling in the Gaps by Treaty
The international community should consider developing a
treaty specifically designed to protect shark fisheries from overex-
ploitation. Such a treaty should generally focus on improving fish-
ery management and developing standards that will be
implemented by national governments, existing RFMOs, and the
proposed Global Fisheries Management Organization (GFMO).
The adoption of voluntary guidelines and other non-binding soft
law instruments has been and will continue to be insufficient to ad-
dress the problem of shark population depletion adequately.157
Soft law instruments provide little accountability among States and
the international community and are unable to generate adequate
funding necessary for addressing the overexploitation of sharks.
Binding treaties are generally more difficult to accomplish because
of political resistance. However, given the current popularity of
sharks, jurisdictional gaps in fishery management, and limited pro-
visions required for the Shark Conservation Treaty (SCT), a bind-
ing treaty's adoption would be more likely.
Like whales, sharks have arguably gained sufficient notoriety to
be classified as megafauna in the international community and to
merit their own treaty.'58 For the SCT to be successful, it should
avoid further fragmentation of international law and instead focus
on complementing existing international law. Such an approach
will avoid resource inefficiencies from overlap and potentially in-
crease political will. Because there is no binding international
treaty focused on sharks, taking such a specific approach will com-
plement existing marine fishery laws. Additionally, the SCT should
incorporate by reference all effective provisions and procedures of
157. See International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of
Sharks, FOOD & AGlc. ORG. OF THE U.N, 1, 11 (1999) (describing international
agreement responsible for management of compliance with Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries). The IPOA for sharks has been in place since 1999 and
there is no clear evidence that it is helping curb the problem of overfishing sharks
on the high seas. Id.
158. See generally Is Shark Finning Legal?, SHARK ANGELS, http://www.
sharkangels.com/index.php/issues-facing-sharks/laws-protecting-sharks/shark-fin-
ning (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (discussing international laws that prohibit shark
finning). For example, Discovery's Shark Week has been one of its top rated pro-
grams since airing in the summer of 1987. Id. Additionally, countries from all
over the world have taken national measures against finning, including flat bans
and landing requirements. Id.
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UNCLOS. Incorporating by reference or adopting similar provi-
sions and procedures should reduce the likelihood of political con-
flict in passing such a treaty since UNCLOS has already been
adopted by 165 nation States.
The SCT should include provisions primarily for funding, sci-
entific research, and the establishment of the GFMO to remedy cur-
rent jurisdictional vacuums in the high seas. Specifically, the
GFMO should have jurisdiction for establishing shark and other
marine species protection measures in all areas of the high seas not
yet governed by RFMOs, and it should work with existing RFMOs to
improve their measures and enforcement. TACs established by the
GFMO should be based on the best scientific evidence available and
it should coordinate with all States and RFMOs for enforcement
matters. In the event that new credible RFMOs can be and are es-
tablished, the GFMO should concede jurisdiction and act only in an
advisory capacity.
In addition to the GFMO, the SCT should establish a scientific
body analogous to the IWC's Scientific Committee. This committee
should be funded according to provisions in the treaty and should
focus its efforts on filling the gaps in scientific data about shark
populations. Such a committee could overcome the fragmented re-
search system that currently exists within RFMOs. Specifically, the
committee should develop a set of universal research guidelines to
be implemented by RFMOs and then should collect all RFMO data
to establish a global picture on the state of shark populations, focus-
ing on straddling, highly migratory, and high seas stocks.
For purposes of regulating shark fisheries, RFMOs should ex-
clusively continue to govern straddling and highly migratory stocks
in their regions. However, the GFMO should have jurisdiction to
establish TACs and other regulations for all shark and other marine
species in ungoverned high seas areas, including those straddling
or highly migratory stocks not currently overseen by existing
RFMOs. This jurisdiction will permit the GFMO to alter existing
and develop new regulations over time. SCT member States should
then implement those regulations. Similarly, RFMOs should adopt
those regulations for their member States, including those not
members of the SCT. Through this approach, the GFMO will not
be an enforcement body, but will rely on flag and port States to
enforce TACs and other regulations.
Currently, scholars who have considered the possibility of a
shark conservation treaty have suggested that at least one ideal pro-
vision would be a requirement for member States to adopt provi-
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sions of law stating that all shark fins landed must be attached to
the full shark body or that there be a fin to body ratio require-
ment.159 A provision of this nature should not be included within
the SCT for several reasons: First, this provision would almost cer-
tainly guarantee China's refusal to join the SCT, as it would dispro-
portionately affect its citizens. Those fishing for sharks, primarily
Southeast Asian fishers, would lose most of their haul space to mer-
cury-laden meat of little to no value. Second, such a provision
would likely not curb catch and consumption of sharks. In the
short term, it would reduce supply and increase the price of the
fins. With the increase in price, it would ultimately drive more fish-
ermen to harvest sharks for their fins, and Asia has over seventy-
three percent of the world's marine vessels.160 Thus, this regulation
would only lead to greater inefficiency in resources and an increase
in externalities associated with high seas fishing efforts. 61 Third, a
step in this direction would further polarize China from the inter-
national community and likely increase its chances of refusing to
cooperate in other fishery-related international law. Fourth, States
interested in adopting such measures can do so domestically or re-
gionally with like-minded States.'62 Finally, this provision would
not solve the issue of FOC because fishers could land sharks in
States with lax enforcement, package them, and ship them for trade
to China.
159. See Walker, supra note 5, at 158 (advocating for ban on finning through a
mandatory fins-attached provision until offloaded for processing); see also Ander-
son, supra note 16, at 536 (advocating for ban on finning, which would necessarily
require landing sharks with fins attached); Osch, supra note 54, at 415, 428 (sug-
gesting both "full utilization" provisions, requiring that most of shark be landed
with fins at first landing and use of trade measures to implement ban on finning).
160. See FAO, supra note 23, at 10 (describing fishery industry, its locations,
and job creation). Of the 4.36 million vessels in existence, 3.18 million are in Asia.
Id.
161. See id. (discussing fishing industry, regulation successes and failures).
Externalities affected by such regulation would include pollution, bycatch, and
habitat destruction. Id.
162. See Shark Finning Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 106-557, 114 Stat 2772
(2000) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1822 (2012)) (describing international
fishery agreements). The United States adopted the Shark Finning Prohibition
Act in 2000. Id. The Act requires that all shark fins must be landed with their
corresponding carcasses and includes a rebuttable presumption of violation where
the shark fins landed constitute more than five percent of the total shark carcasses'
weight. Id. A domestic action such as this is much different than attempting to
compel another country to adopt such provisions through forms of international
pressure and coercion. Id. For a list of other States that have adopted similar
measures, see SHARK ANGELS, supra note 158 (cataloguing regulations and laws
prohibiting shark finning).
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Several scholars have also suggested the adoption of trade mea-
sures.163 One suggestion involves the use of unilateral trade mea-
sures, referencing the potential of restricting importation of tuna
that has not been caught in a shark-safe way by nations without fin-
ning bans. It is important to note that such a restriction would
likely only address issues of bycatch of sharks and not targeted
shark fishing. Such a suggestion relies on a World Trade Organiza-
tion Appellate Body Report upholding the United States' ban on
imports of shrimp harvested without turtle excluder devices
(TEDs).1 6 4 Scholarly reliance on this case, however, is misguided.
The decision finding that the U.S. requirement did not violate the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) depended on the
finding of a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endan-
gered marine populations involved and the United States.' 65 Thus,
trade restrictions for species that lack a sufficient nexus to the im-
plementing State will likely violate GATT. A sufficient nexus re-
quirement would seemingly preclude all non-highly-migratory
sharks in the high seas and potentially all non-endangered species.
Despite this limitation, the value of a trade-related system would be
useful and should be considered by the GFMO and RFMOs to the
extent that it will not violate GATT. To that end, these organiza-
tions should look toward the CDS system adopted by CCAMLR for
protecting Patagonian Toothfish.166
163. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 536 (recommending trade measures as
part of enforcement structure); see generally CALLEY, supra note 70 (identifying mar-
ket denial as means to crack down on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
outside national jurisdictions); see also Osch, supra note 54, at 402 (discussing inter-
national trade regimes through World Trade Organization as possible regulatory
response); Walker, supra note 5, at 154 (discussing business and trade restrictions
generally).
164. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1238 (highlighting the Shrimp/Turtle
decision upholding U.S. import ban on shrimp harvests conducted without certain
environmentally conscious procedures); see generally Appellate Body Report,
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu e/cases e/ds58_e.htm.
165. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 1240 (detailing court's reasoning in
case regarding use of TEDs in shrimp harvesting and importation); Appellate Body
Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
ucts, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/dispu-e/cases-e/ds58_e.htm.
166. For more information about this system, see WILLOCK, supra note 110, at
7-13 (describing purposes and goals of CDS as attempts to create paper trails of
toothfish from vessels to importation). Under the CDS system, flag States issue
vessels a catch document with a unique catch document number. Id. The flag
State then issues a confirmation number prior to the catch being landed, verifying
the landing is not in violation of existing toothfish fishery laws. Id. The flag State
then electronically transmits this data to the CCAMLR secretariat. Id. Alterna-
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One final provision that should be included in the SCT is a
strong version of the precautionary principle. The purpose of this
principle would be to ensure that fishing that poses a threat to
shark populations is prevented from adversely affecting the stock,
even without conclusive scientific proof.167 The provision adopted
should direct the GFMO and RFMOs to recognize the reality of
IUU fishing and FOC for sharks and require them to incorporate
these factors into any determinations of TACs for specific shark spe-
cies. In this manner, shark populations would receive greater
protection.
Having addressed the most relevant provisions that should be
included in the SCT, it is important to note that the SCT would
likely still have several weaknesses. These weaknesses include the
inability to muster enough political support to make such a treaty
meaningful, the difficulty of ensuring adequate funding from mem-
ber nations for research efforts, and the potential for intergovern-
mental organization conflict, specifically between RFMOs and the
GFMO, over the jurisdiction and regulation of marine species. The
suggested provisions of the SCT have been specifically crafted to
avoid these weaknesses as much as possible. The weaknesses that
this treaty would not be able to address fully without the support of
China are IUU fishing and FOC. For this reason, it is imperative
for scholars and the international community to reprioritize their
efforts toward diplomatic compromises concerning the regulation
of shark fisheries with relevant States, especially China.
C. The International Community and China: Diplomacy is Not
Dead
Ockham's razor is a principle used in problem solving stating
that among competing solutions, the one that is the simplest should
be selected. 168 With that principle in mind, an international treaty
dependent on the compliance of over two hundred nations de-
signed to pressure a single nation into compliance with shark pro-
tection provisions will be less effective than that single nation
tively, a port State can issue a certificate of landing for toothfish landed in its terri-
tory if it is satisfied that the catch was legal. Id. In a similar fashion, exporter,
importer, and re-exporter verifications occur. WILLOCK, supra note 110, at 7-13.
167. See Harris, supra note 128, at 419-20 (indicating precautionary principle
"was established to protect the environment in the face of scientific uncertainty" by
evaluating risks of proposed activities affecting environmental stability).
168. See Ockham's Razor, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRIrANNICA, http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/424706/Ockhams-razor (last updated Sept. 4, 2012) (ex-
plaining Ockham's razor principle).
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enforcing domestic laws to the same end. This idea begs the ques-
tion of how the international community should approach China.
The first step to building consensus with China and reaching a
compromise on shark fishery regulation would be for the interna-
tional community to stop blaming China for its culture of eating
shark fin soup. As mentioned, such an approach is ethnocentric
and decreases the likelihood of China's cooperation. Instead, the
problem should be recognized as a complex one that includes mul-
tiple nations, IUU fishing, FOC, and the fundamental failures of
existing marine fishery governance.
The second step would be to acknowledge and praise China's
progress. For example, although slow going, China is making pro-
gress with shark conservation, including a ban on the dish for gov-
ernment banquets. 169 A Gallup poll in 2011 showed that more than
half of Chinese people believe the environment should take prece-
dence over the economy. 70 Furthermore, in Article 20 of its
Marine Protection law, China states that efforts shall be made to
restore and renovate marine ecosystems of important economic
and social value.171 By recognizing these successes and appealing
to China to adopt national laws regulating the shark fishery and
importation of fins, the international community will likely have
greater success in addressing shark population depletion. How-
ever, it must be recognized that, at this moment, China is facing
many other domestic environmental challenges that its government
is likely prioritizing, including air pollution, water pollution, and
desertification. 7 2
169. See Amy Quinn, Taste for Shark Fin Fades Slightly in China, N.Y. TIMES Jan.
28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/world/asia/taste-for-shark-fin-
fades-slightly-in-china.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0&ref=environment (discussing
how shark eating is deterred in China in effort to combat shark extinction).
170. See Daniela Yu & Anita Pugliese, Majority of Chinese Prioritize Environment
over the Economy, GALLUP (June 8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1 55102/ma-
jority-chinese-prioritize-environment-economy.aspx (comparing China's environ-
mental attitudes to those of other nations). Additionally, China is the world's
largest investor in green energy. See The East is Grey, ECONoMIST (Aug. 10, 2013),
available at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21583245-china-worlds-
worst-polluter-largest-investor-green-energy-its-rise-will-have (arguing that ecologi-
cal consequences of growth have caused China to hit an environmental turning
point).
171. Marine Environment Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, MINISTRY
OF ENVTL. PROT. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://english.mep.gov.cn/
PoliciesRegulations/laws/environmentallaws/200710/t20071009_109912.htm
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014) (setting forth China's law for marine environmental
protection).
172. Mark Lallanilla, Environmental Issues in China : The Country's Top 6 Con-
cerns, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2013, 10:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
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The third step would be to choose diplomatic efforts with
China and the environment wisely. It is clear that China is very
hostile to international governance when claims to its territorial
sovereignty are challenged.173 Thus, environmental issues that do
not implicate that issue would be an ideal starting point.
The fourth and final step would be to leverage China's obvious
interests. China has an incentive to cooperate in maintaining sus-
tainable shark fisheries. Since 2012, China has been by far the lead-
ing fish exporter, contributing almost twelve percent of the 2010
world exports of fish and fishery products, or about 13.3 billion dol-
lars, and increasing to 17.1 billion dollars in 2011.174 China is also
the third-largest importer of fishery products.175 In addition, China
accounts for more than sixty percent of the world's aquaculture.176
Thus, China has a vested interest in ensuring shark sustainability.
To ensure sustainable shark populations, the international commu-
nity should increase its diplomatic efforts with China and consider
adopting the aforementioned steps.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the words of one Guardian reporter, "[I]t's time to end
China-bashing on the environment" and to refocus efforts on diplo-
macy.'77 Adherence to international law is based on active manage-
com/2013/03/18/environmental-issues-china n_2900435.html (listing China's
environmental concerns).
173. See Julian Ku, Goodbye UNCLOS Dispute Settlement? China Walks away from
UNCLOS Arbitration with the Philippines, OPINIO JUIus (Feb. 19, 2013, 10:53 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/02/19/goodbye-unclos-dispute-settlement-china-
walks-away-from-unclos-arbitration-with-the-philippines/ (commenting on China's
rejection of arbitration agreement with Philippines concerning South China Sea).
China walked out of this UNCLOS arbitration with the Philippines likely because it
involved issues of territorial claims by China that it expressly reserved in its ratifica-
tion of the treaty. Id. For a further discussion of the agreement, see Declarations
and Statements, U.N. Div. FOR OcEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, http://www.
un.org/depts/los/conventionagreements/conventiondeclarations.htm#China
Upon ratification (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
174. See FAO, supra note 23, at 70-71 (detailing China's fish exporting
industry).
175. See id. (analyzing China's fishery imports).
176. See id. (comparing China's aquaculture to other nations' aquaculture).
Aquaculture is becoming more viable, producing 63.6 million tons of fish in 2011
with an estimated value of $119 billion. Id. More than 100 million people depend
on aquaculture for their living. One obvious problem with aquaculture for sharks
is their long maturation and low fecundity. Id.
177. Li Shou, Why It's Time to End China-Bashing on the Environment, GuARDIAN
ENV'T NETWORK (Apr. 16, 2013, 12:39 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environ-
ment/2013/apr/16/time-end-china-bashing-environment (explaining effects of
international involvement concerning China's environmental governance).
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ment by parties and other actors rather than coercion.178 To the
extent that non-coercive approaches are possible, they should be
taken. In that regard, diplomacy should be a top priority for shark
and other marine conservation, followed by the repair of the UN-
CLOS regime and adoption of the SCT. Though these efforts will
inevitably require some time to accomplish, when it comes to gov-
erning such a vast global commons as the high seas, there are no
quick fixes.
178. See YOUNG, supra note 48, at 185 (concluding coercion does not ensure
adherence to international law).
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